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BOOK REVIEW
Just Words: Constitutional Rights And Social Wrongs
By JOEL BAKAN
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997)l 230 pages
Joel Bakan has written an excellent book about the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 He treats constitutional litigation as a
problematic-a site from which to begin asking questions, rather than an
end in itself, and his approach is sceptical (not cynical, he hastens to
add). Just Words is fundamentally a skepticism about liberalism, and a
plea for legal analysts, and anyone interested in law and politics, to take
private power seriously. The Charter, Bakan argues, will not do this, and
that is its most significant weakness.
The themes in Just Words may be somewhat familiar reading to
those already acquainted with left analyses of the Charter. However,
Bakan's approach is slightly different to some of this work.3 First, he is
willing to acknowledge that some good may come out of constitutional
litigation. Second, he makes the useful point that Charter critics often
over-emphasize the importance of the Charter to "real life." Bakan
suggests, albeit in his conclusion, that, at the end of the day, the Charter
may have few effects on peoples' lived experience. Later in the review, I
suggest that this position creates some tension for the book, and Bakan's
project, as a whole. But first, I will set out the framework and key
arguments of Just Words.
The introductory chapter is clear and forthright. Bakan's writing
style is elegant, yet unadorned, and he pulls no punches here arguing
that "the Charter is only paper, dead tree, with ink on it."4 What he
means is that the Charter is meaningless in isolation from its social
context, and that social context, to a large extent, determines legal
possibilities. Bakan's approach is to test the Charter for its ability to
further values he defines as key-equality, freedom, and democracy.
These he interprets substantively, asking whether, in Charter discourse,
they are advanced in a progressive fashion or merely words on paper.
I [hereinafter Just Words].
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
3 See, for example, M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics (Toronto:
Wall & Thompson, 1989); and A.C. Hutchinson, Waiting for CORAF: A Critique of Law and Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).
4 Just Words, supra note 1 at 3.
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Bakan begins with a closely argued engagement with those who
defend, on various grounds, the legitimacy of judges judging.S He
concludes that the defenders' arguments exhibit more faith than reason.
This chapter perhaps ought to have preceded or followed chapter 7, an
analysis of judicial ideologies. Read together, these chapters
persuasively argue the point that judging is deeply political and
fundamentally constrained by social structures. While some readers
might find this material familiar, those who teach law from a critical
perspective will know how many students, and colleagues, need to hear
it.
The "meat" of the Charter analysis is in chapters 3, 4, and 5, on
equality, free expression, and freedom of association respectively.
Bakan argues that section 15 of the Charter, the equality provision, "is
unlikely to have a substantial effect on inequality in Canada because the
Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of it ... embodies anti-statism
and atomism." 6 His point here is that the form of equality rights
engenders an approach to both litigation and adjudication that treats
complex social issues as discrete phenomena that can be resolved
without an understanding of wider institutions and practices. Bakan
constantly reminds the reader that equality means nothing in isolation
or, as he says with regard to Aboriginal rights,
[N]o matter how broadly constitutional protection of Aboriginal [fishing] rights is
defined, its effects are still entirely dependent on there being salmon to fish. ... The
Aboriginal right to fish can protect First Nations only from discrete restrictions on their
ability to fish salmon, but not from related structures of political economy and
colonialism that are destroying the fishery.7
Bakan's free expression analysis is largely focused on dispelling
the Charter-induced illusion that the state is the main culprit when it
comes to the silencing of speech. Instead, he shows how the primary
forces denying free speech emanate from the deployment of private
power, not state power. He also provides a very useful approach to the
"censorship debates," arguing, more clearly than I have seen it done
elsewhere, that some forms of speech are in themselves speech denials.8
Bakan reiterates a similar analysis in relation to freedom of association,
contending that it is private economic power, not state action, that is the
primary dissolver of workers' rights. While the author sees some small
51bid c. 2.
6 1bid. at 45.
7 IbidL at 58-59.
8 Ibid at 72-76.
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progressive potential in the Charter's free expression provision, he sees
none at all here. He suggests that even if the Supreme Court were more
worker positive they could accomplish virtually nothing to alter the
erosion of workers' rights, because the court's remit does not extend to
policing private economic forces.
In chapter 6, Bakan extends his analysis to argue that the Charter
is not simply or only a no-hoper for progressive movements. The
Charter, he suggests, has actually furthered business and racist interests
through courts providing such interests with free expression rights.
Furthermore, Bakan demonstrates how left-leaning governments are in
fact reined in by the Charter, and unable to carry out radical social policy
alternatives due to accusations of rights violation (the NDP government in
British Columbia being one example). At the same time, Bakan
provides a thorough critique of one form of progressive initiative-the
idea of social rights.9
Chapter 8 operationalizes Bakan's analysis in a fascinating study
of the womens' rights discourse flying about during the Charlottetown
Accord debates.lO His goal is to show how rights-talk constrained
communication, strategy, alliances, and results, and he does this
persuasively. I would have liked to see more of this in Just Words; for
someone who recognizes the importance of context, many of Bakan's
remarks, including those with which I agree, are made in the abstract.
Bakan acknowledges that his book is not a study of "extra-litigation
effects." 11 But, Just Words is a study of the Charter, and the Charter's
effects, and Bakan makes some very clear statements about the Charter's
potential. More "on the ground" analysis, such as that on the
Charlottetown Accord, would have added to the book's strength.
Similarly, I would have liked to see Bakan engage, not just with
liberal and marxist critics, but also with the postmodern discourse
analysis that he clearly finds wanting. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe are mentioned, 12 but perhaps in future work Bakan could deal
more directly with the claims made by Canadian and American
constitutional rights theorists, for example those working in the queer
9 1bid. c. 9.
10 See Consensus Report on the Constitution: Charlottetown, 28 August 1992, Final Text
(Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1992) [hereinafter Charlottetown Accord]. On the debate that
surrounded it see, for example, K. McRoberts & P.J. Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord the
Referendum, and the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
11 Supra note 1 at 153, n. 3.
12 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic
Politics (London: Verso, 1985) at 131, 148.
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theory area. I got the sense throughout Just Words that Bakan was
tip-toeing around the progressive rights-defenders.
But perhaps Bakan's own perspective is an ambivalent one, and
that is responsible for some of his hesitancy. On the one hand, Bakan is
clear that capitalist relations prevent the Charter from being anything
other than just words. On the other hand, throughout the book, the
author suggests that the Charter could be put to progressive use.1 3
Perhaps Bakan is simply saying that if we lived in a different world, with
different social relations, the same Charter could be a very different
thing. But if that is what he means, then he is suggesting that it cannot
be much of anything in this world, and certainly many progressive
movements would disagree.
I also wondered whether Bakan himself put too much emphasis
on words. For example, he spends some time showing how the Charter's
restriction to state action, not inaction, is a huge constraint upon the
demands of social movements.14 But I am not so sure. Constitutional
gay rights claims, for example, may be based on state
action-legislation-but the actual claim is about state inaction, about
exclusion, about denial. The dichotomy of action/inaction may not be as
stark as Bakan suggests. I also find the argument that the Charter has no
effect at all on private interests to be unpersuasive. Not only do human
rights laws, bound by the Charter, apply to private actors but Bakan does
not really engage with ideas about the symbolic power of constitutional
rights. Just Words hints at a compelling critique of these ideas, and I
would have liked to see it developed here.
In his conclusion, Bakan suggests the Charter has not had much
effect on peoples' lives at all. Why then should we care about it? Having
been too long outside Canada now, I cannot answer this with reference
to Canadian political developments. Perhaps a different response is
provided in Britain at the moment. The Labour government is about to
incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights,' and this will
effectively create quasi-constitutional rights within the United Kingdom
for the first time. Living in Britain, as I do now, I am struck constantly
by a sense of dija vu. Debates that have been ongoing in Canada for
many years are being played out here, with wheels reinvented and,
seemingly, little learned from experience elsewhere. Joel Bakan's Just
13 Supra note 1 at 6-7, 55, 62.
1 4 See, for example, ibid. at 48.
15 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4
November 1950, Eur. T.S. 5.
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Words should be compulsory reading for rights-talkers here. And his
comments on citizenship, social rights, and democracy should be read by
all those involved in the Blairite project and its discourse of
exclusion/inclusion.
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